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ABSTRACT
Performance and high availability have become increasingly
important drivers, amongst other drivers, for user reten-
tion in the context of web services such as social networks,
and web search. Exogenic and/or endogenic factors often
give rise to anomalies, making it very challenging to main-
tain high availability, while also delivering high performance.
Given that service-oriented architectures (SOA) typically have
a large number of services, with each service having a large
set of metrics, automatic detection of anomalies is non-
trivial. Although there exists a large body of prior research
in anomaly detection, existing techniques are not applicable
in the context of social network data, owing to the inherent
seasonal and trend components in the time series data.
To this end, we developed two novel statistical techniques
for automatically detecting anomalies in cloud infrastructure
data. Specifically, the techniques employ statistical learning
to detect anomalies in both application, and system metrics.
Seasonal decomposition is employed to filter the trend and
seasonal components of the time series, followed by the use
of robust statistical metrics – median and median absolute
deviation (MAD) – to accurately detect anomalies, even in
the presence of seasonal spikes. We demonstrate the efficacy
of the proposed techniques from three different perspectives,
viz., capacity planning, user behavior, and supervised learn-
ing. In particular, we used production data for evaluation,
and we report Precision, Recall, and F-measure in each case.
1. INTRODUCTION
Big Data is characterized by the increasing volume (on the
order of zetabytes), and the velocity of data generation [1, 2].
It is projected that the market size of Big Data shall climb up
from the current market size of $5.1 billion [3] to $53.7 billion
by 2017. In a recent report [4], EMC Corporation stated: “A
major factor behind the expansion of the digital universe is
the growth of machine generated data, increasing from 11%
of the digital universe in 2005 to over 40% in 2020.” In the
context of social networks, analysis of User Big Data is key
to building an engaging social network; in a similar fashion,
analysis of Machine Big Data is key to building an efficient
and performant underlying cloud computing platform.
Anomalies in Big Data can potentially result in losses to
the business – in both revenue [5], as well as in long term
reputation [6]. To this end, several enterprise-wide monitor-
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ing initiatives [7, 8] have been undertaken. Likewise, there
has been an increasing emphasis on developing techniques
for detection, and root cause analysis, of performance issues
in the cloud [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15].
A lot of research has been done in the context of anomaly
detection in various domains such as, but not limited to,
statistics, signal processing, finance, econometrics, manufac-
turing, and networking [16, 17, 18, 19]. In a recent survey
paper Chandola et al. highlighted that anomalies are con-
textual in nature [20] and remarked the following:
A data instance might be a contextual anomaly in
a given context, but an identical data instance (in
terms of behavioral attributes) could be consid-
ered normal in a different context. This property
is key in identifying contextual and behavioral at-
tributes for a contextual anomaly detection tech-
nique.
Detection of anomalies in the presence of seasonality, and an
underlying trend – which are both characteristic of the time
series data of social networks – is non-trivial. Figure 1 il-
lustrates the presence of both positive and negative anoma-
lies – corresponding to the circled data points – in time
series data obtained from production. From the figure we
note that the time series has a very conspicuous seasonality,
and that there are multiple modes within a seasonal period.
Existing techniques for anomaly detection (overviewed in-
depth in Section 5) are not amenable for time series data
with the aforementioned characteristics. To this end, we de-
veloped novel techniques for automated anomaly detection
in the cloud via statistical learning. In particular, the main
contributions of the paper are as follows:
r First, we propose novel statistical learning based tech-
niques to detect anomalies in the cloud. The proposed
techniques can be used to automatically detect anoma-
lies in time series data of both application metrics such
as Tweets Per Sec (TPS) and system metrics such as
CPU utilization etc. Specifically, we propose the fol-
lowing:
z Seasonal ESD (S-ESD): This techniques em-
ploys time series decomposition to determine the
seasonal component of a given time series. S-ESD
then applies ESD [21, 22] on the resulting time se-
ries to detect the anomalies.
z Seasonal Hybrid ESD (S-H-ESD): In the case
of some time series (obtained from production) we
observed a relatively high percentage of anoma-
lies. To address such cases, coupled with the fact
that mean and standard deviation (used by ESD)
are highly sensitive to a large number anomalies
[23, 24], we extended S-ESD to use the robust
statistics median [25] and median absolute devi-
ation (MAD) to detect anomalies [26]. Compu-
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Figure 1: An illustrative time series, obtained from production, with positive and negative anomalies
tationally, S-H-ESD is more expensive than S-
ESD, but is more robust to a higher percentage
of anomalies.
r Second, we present a detailed evaluation of the pro-
posed techniques using production data. In particular,
we present the evaluation from three different perspec-
tives:
z Capacity planning: Occurrence of anomalies can
potentially result in violation of service level agree-
ment (SLA), and/or impact end-user experience.
To mitigate the impact of anomalies, timely de-
tection of anomalies is paramount and may re-
quire provisioning additional capacity. Given a
threshold for a system metric (corresponding to
the SLA), we evaluate the efficacy of the proposed
techniques to detect anomalies greater than the
specified threshold.
z User behavior: Change in user behavior – which
may result due to, but not limited to, events such
as the Superbowl – at times manifests itself as
anomalies in time series data. Thus, anomaly de-
tection can guide the study of change in user be-
havior. To this end, we evaluated the efficacy of
the proposed techniques with respect to change
in user behavior.
z Supervised Learning: Given the velocity, volume,
and real-time nature of cloud infrastructure data,
it is not practical to obtain time series data with
“true” anomalies labeled. To address this limita-
tion, we injected anomalies in a randomized fash-
ion in smoothed, using B-spline, production data.
The randomization was done along three dimen-
sions – time of injection, magnitude, and width
of the anomaly. We evaluated the efficacy of the
proposed techniques with respect to detection of
the injected anomalies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays
out the notation used in the rest of the paper, and briefly
overviews statistical background for completeness and better
understanding of the rest of the paper.
Section 3 details the techniques proposed in this paper,
viz., S-ESD and S-H-ESD. Section 4 presents a detailed
evaluation of the aforementioned techniques using production
data.
Previous work is discussed in Section 5. Finally, in Sec-
tion 6 we conclude with directions for future work.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section we describe the notation used in the rest
of the paper. Additionally, we present a brief statistical
background for completeness, and for better understanding
of the rest of the paper.
A time series refers to a set of observations collected se-
quentially in time. Let xt denote the observation at time t,
where t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., and let X denote the set of all obser-
vations constituting the time series.
2.1 Grubbs Test and ESD
In this subsection, we briefly overview the most widely used
existing techniques for anomaly detection. In essence, these
techniques employ statistical hypothesis testing, for a given
significance level [27], to determine whether a datum is anoma-
lous. In other words, the test is used to evaluate the rejec-
tion of the null hypothesis (H0), for a pre-specified level of
significance, in favor of the alternative hypothesis (H1).
2.1.1 Grubbs Test
Grubbs test [28, 29] was developed for detecting the largest
anomaly within a univariate sample set. The test assumes
that the the underlying data distribution is normal. Grubbs’
test is defined for the hypothesis:
H0 :There are no outliers in the data set (1)
H1 :There is at least one outlier in the data set (2)
The Grubbs’ test statistic is defined as follows:
C =
maxt | xt − x |
s
(3)
where, x and s denote the mean and variance of the time
series X. For the two-sided test, the hypothesis of no outliers
is rejected at significance level α if
C >
(N − 1)√
N
√
(tα/(2N),N−2)2
N − 2 + (tα/(2N),N−2)2 (4)
where tα/(2N),N−2 denotes the upper critical values of the t-
distribution with N−2 degrees of freedom and a significance
level of α/(2N). For one-sided tests, α/(2N) becomes α/N
[30]. The largest data point in the time series that is greater
than the test statistic is labeled as an anomaly.
In practice, we observe that there is more than one anomaly
in the time series data obtained from production. Conceiv-
ably, one can iteratively apply Grubbs’ test to detect mul-
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tiple anomalies. Removal of the largest anomaly at each it-
eration reduces the value of N ; however, Grubbs’ test does
not update the value obtained from the t-distribution ta-
bles. Consequently, Grubbs’ test is not suited for detecting
multiple outliers in a given time series data.
Several other approaches, such as the Tietjen-Moore test1
[31], and the extreme Studentized deviate (ESD) test [21,
22] have been proposed to address the aforementioned issue.
Next, we briefly overview ESD.
2.1.2 Extreme Studentized Deviate (ESD)
The Extreme Studentized Deviate test (ESD) [21] (and its
generalized version [22]) can also be used to detect multi-
ple anomalies in the given time series. Unlike the Tietjen-
Moore test, it only requires an upper bound on the number
of anomalies (k) to be specified. In the worst case, the num-
ber of anomalies can be at most 49.9% of the total number of
data points in the given time series. In practice, our obser-
vation, based on production data, has been that the number
of anomalies is typically less than 1% in the context of ap-
plication metrics and less than 5% in the context of system
metrics.
ESD computes the following test statistic for the k most
extreme values in the data set.
Ck =
maxk | xk − x |
s
(5)
The test statistic is then compared with a critical value,
computed using Equation 6, to determine whether a value
is anomalous. If the value is indeed anomalous, it is removed
from the data set, and the critical value is recalculated from
the remaining data.
λk =
(n− k)tp,n−k−1√
(n− k − 1 + t2p,n−k−1 )(n− k + 1)
(6)
ESD repeats this process k times, with the number of anoma-
lies equal to the largest k such that Ck > λk. In practice,
Ck may swing above and below λk multiple times before
permanently becoming less then λk.
In the case of Grubbs’ test, the above would cause the
test to prematurely exit; however, ESD will continue until
the test has run for k outliers.
2.2 Median and Median Absolute Deviation
The techniques discussed in the previous subsection use mean
and standard deviation. It is well known that these metrics
are sensitive to anomalous data [25, 32]. As such, the use
of the statistically robust median, and the median absolute
deviation (MAD), has been proposed to address these issues.
The sample mean x¯ can be distorted by a single anomaly,
with the distortion increasing as xt → ±∞. By contradis-
tinction, the sample median is robust against such distor-
tions, and can tolerate up to 50% of the data being anoma-
lous. Thus, the sample mean is said to have a breakdown
point [33, 34] of 0, while the sample median is said to have
a breakdown point of 0.5.
For a univariate data set X1, X2, ..., Xn, MAD is defined
as the median of the absolute deviations from the sample
median. Formally,
1Although the Tietjen-Moore test can be used to detect mul-
tiple anomalies, it requires the number of anomalies to de-
tect to be pre-specified. This is not practical in the current
context.
MAD = mediani(|Xi −medianj(Xj)|) (7)
Unlike standard deviation, MAD is robust against anomalies
in the input data [26, 25]. Furthermore, MAD can be used to
estimate standard deviation by scaling MAD by a constant
factor b.
σˆ = b ·MAD (8)
where b = 1.4826 is used for normally distributed data
(irrespective of non-normality introduced by outliers) [35].
When another underlying distribution is assumed, Leyes et
al. suggest b = 1
Q(0.75)
, where Q(0.75) is the 0.75 quantile of
the underlying distribution [23].
2.3 Precision, Recall, and F-Measure
As mentioned earlier in Section 1, the efficacy of the pro-
posed techniques were evaluated from three different per-
spectives. In each case we report the following metrics –
Precision, Recall, and F-measure (these metrics are com-
monly used to report the efficacy of an algorithm in data
mining, information retrieval, et cetera).
In the context of anomaly detection, Precision is defined
as follows:
Precision =
|{S} ∩ {G}|
|{S}| =
tp
tp+ fp
(9)
where S is the set of detected anomalies, and G is the set
of ground-truth anomalies. In other words, Precision is the
ratio of true positives (tp) over the sum of true positives (tp)
and false positives (fp) that have actually been detected.
In the context of anomaly detection, Recall is defined as
follows:
Recall =
|{S} ∩ {G}|
|{G}| =
tp
tp+ fn
(10)
where fn denotes false negatives. Lastly, F-measure is de-
fined as follows:
F = 2× precision× recall
precision + recall
(11)
Since Precision and Recall are weighted equally in Equa-
tion 11, the measure is also referred as the F1-measure, or
the balanced F-score. Given that there is a trade-off between
Precision and Recall, the F-measure is often generalized as
follows:
Fβ = (1 + β
2)× precision× recall
β2 × precision + recall where β ≥ 0
If β > 1, F is said to become more recall-oriented and if
β < 1, F is said to become more precision-oriented [36].
3. TECHNIQUES
In this section we detail our approaches Seasonal ESD (S-
ESD) and Seasonal Hybrid ESD (S-H-ESD). Note that
both the approaches are currently deployed to automatically
detect anomalies in production data on a daily basis. We
employed an incremental approach in developing the two
approaches. In particular, we started with evaluating the
“rule of thumb” (the Three Sigma Rule) using production
https://github.com/twitter/AnomalyDetection/
Raw Data
μ  + 3 σ  (First Half)
μ  + 3 σ  (Raw Data)
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Figure 2: Application of 3 · σ to the time series corresponding to Figure 1
data and progressively learned the limitations of using the
existing techniques for automatically detecting anomalies in
production data. In the rest of this section we walk the
reader through the core steps of our aforementioned incre-
mental approach.
3.1 Three-Sigma Rule
As a first cut, the 3 · σ “rule” is commonly used to detect
anomalies in a given data set. Specifically, data points with
values more than 3 times the sample standard deviation are
deemed anomalous. The rule can potentially be used for
capturing large global anomalies, but is ill-suited for detect-
ing seasonal anomalies. This is exemplified by Figure 2,
wherein the seasonal anomalies that could not be captured
using the 3 · σ “rule” are annotated with circles.
Conceivably, one can potentially segment the input time
series into multiple windows and apply the aforementioned
rule on each window using their respective σ. The intu-
ition behind segmentation being that the input time series
is non-stationary and consequently σ varies over time. The
variation in σ for different window lengths is shown in Fig-
ure 3.
Window Length
R
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Mean of σ Standard Deviation of σ
Figure 3: Distribution of σ for different window lengths
From Figure 2 we note that applying the rule on a per-
window basis – the time series was segmented into two win-
dows – does not facilitate capturing of the seasonal anoma-
lies.
The 3 · σ “rule” assumes that the underlying data distri-
bution is normal. However, our experience has been that
the time series data obtained from production is seldom, if
at all, normal (see Figure 4 for an example).
In light of the aforementioned limitations, we find that the
3 ·σ “rule” is not applicable in the current context. Next, we
explored the efficacy of using moving average for anomaly
detection.
Figure 4: Data distribution of the time series corresponding
to Figure 1
3.2 Moving Averages
One of the key aspects associated with anomaly detection
is to mitigate the impact of the presence of white noise. To
this end, the use of moving averages has been proposed to
filter (/smooth) out white noise.
The most common moving average is the simple moving
average (SMA), which is defined as:
SMAt =
xt + xt−1 + . . .+ xt−(n−1)
n
(12)
Note that SMA weighs each of the previous n data points
equally. This may not desirable given the dynamic nature
of the data stream observed in production and from a re-
cency perspective. To this end, the use of the exponentially
weighted moving average (EWMA), defined by Equation 13,
has been proposed [37].
EWMAT ≡
{
yt = xt, t = 1
yt = α(xt) + (1− α)yt−1, t > 1 (13)
In [38], Carter and Streilein argue that in the context of
streaming time series data EWMA can potentially be “volatile
to abrupt transient changes, losing utility for appropriately
detecting anomalies”. To address this, they proposed the
Probabilistic Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (PEWMA),
wherein the weighting parameter α is adapted by (1−βPt),
Pt is the probability of xt evaluated under some modeled
distribution, and β is the weight placed on Pt. The SMA,
EWMA and PEWMA for the time series of Figure 1 is shown
in Figure 5a. From the figure we note that the SMA and
EWMA do not fare well with respect to capturing the daily
seasonality. Although PEWMA traces the raw time series
https://github.com/twitter/AnomalyDetection/
Raw Data EMA PEWMA SMA
(a) SMA, EWMA and PEWMA for the time series of Figure 1
Raw Data True Anomalies PEWMA-ESD Anomalies
(b) Scatter plot of “true” anomalies and anomalies detected by applying ESD on PEWMA
Figure 5: Illustration of limitations of using moving averages for anomaly detection
better (than SMA and EWMA), it fails to capture both
global as well as seasonal anomalies.
We evaluated the efficacy of using SMA, EWMA, and
PEWMA as an input for anomaly detection. Our experi-
ence, using production data, was that the respective mov-
ing averages filter out most of the seasonal anomalies and
consequently are ill-suited for the current context. This is
illustrated by Figure 5b from which we note that applica-
tion of ESD on PEWMA fails to detect “true” anomalies
(annotated on the raw time series with circles).
Further, given that a moving average is a lagging indica-
tor, it is not suited for real time anomaly detection.
Arguably, one can use shorter window length, when com-
puting a moving average, to better trace the input time se-
ries. However, as shown in [39], the standard error of σ
(∝ 1√
n−1 ), increases as the window length decreases. This
is illustrated in Figure 3 (window length decreases from right
to left).
3.3 Seasonality and STL
As discussed in the previous section, Twitter data (obtained
from production) exhibits heavy seasonality. Further, in
most cases, the underlying distribution exhibits a multi-
modal distribution, as exemplified by Figure 4. This limits
the applicability of existing anomaly detection techniques
such as Grubbs and ESD as the existing techniques assume
a normal data distribution. Specifically, we learned based
on data analysis that the presence of multiple modes yields
a higher value of standard deviation (the increase can be
as much as up to 5%) which in turn leads to masking of
detection of some of the “true” anomalies.
To this end, we employ time series decomposition wherein
a given time series (X) is decomposed into three – seasonal
(SX), trend (TX), and residual (RX) – components. The
residual has a unimodal distribution that is amenable to the
application of anomaly detection techniques such as ESD.
Before moving on, let us first define sub-cycle series [40]:
Definition 1. A sub-cycle series comprises of values at
each position of a seasonal cycle. For example, if the series
is monthly with a yearly periodicity, then the first sub-cycle
series is the January values, the second is the February val-
ues, and so forth.
Time series decomposition approaches can be either addi-
tive or multiplicative [41], with additive decomposition be-
ing appropriate for seasonal data that has a constant magni-
tude as is the case in the current context. The algorithm first
derives TX using a moving average filter, and subsequently
subtracts it from the X. Once the trend is removed, SX
is then estimated as the average of the data points within
the corresponding sub-cycle series. Note that the number of
data points per period is an input to the algorithm in order
to create the sub-cycle series. In the current context, we set
the number of data points per period to be a function of the
data granularity. The residual RX is estimated as follows:
RX = X − TX − SX (14)
The residual component computed above can be potentially
corrupted by extreme anomalies in the input data.
This issue is addressed by STL [40], a robust approach
to decomposition that uses LOESS[42] to estimate the sea-
sonal component. The algorithm consists of an inner loop
that derives the trend, seasonal, and residual components
and an outer loop that increases the robustness of the algo-
rithm with respect to anomalies. Akin to classical seasonal
decomposition, the inner loop derives the trend component
using a moving average filter, removes the trend from the
data and then smoothes the sub-cycle series to derive the
seasonal component; however, STL uses LOESS to derive
the seasonality, allowing the decomposition to fit more com-
plex functions than either the additive or multiplicative ap-
proaches. Additionally, STL iteratively converges on the
decomposition, repeating the process several times, or un-
til the difference in iterations is smaller then some specified
threshold (). Optionally, STL can be made more robust
against the influence of anomalies by weighting data points
in an outer loop. The outer loop uses the decomposed com-
ponents to assign a robustness weight to each datum as:
Weightt = B
( |RXt |
6×median|RXt |
)
where B is the bisquare function defined as:
B(u) ≡
{
(1− u2)2 for u ≤ 0 < 1
0 for u > 1
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TrendRaw
Raw Median Adjusted Seasonal
(a) STL with Trend Removal
(b) STL with Median Removal
Residual
Residual
Adjusted Seasonal
Figure 6: STL (a) vs. STL Variant (b) Decomposition
These weights are then used to converge closer to the “true”
decomposed components in the next iteration of the inner
loop.
3.4 Seasonal ESD (S-ESD)
To recap, the applicability of the existing techniques (overviewed
in Section 2) is limited by the following:
z Presence of seasonality in the Twitter time series data
(exemplified by Figure 1).
z Multimodal data distribution of Twitter time series
data (illustrated by Figure 4).
To this end, we propose a novel algorithm, referred to as
Seasonal-ESD (S-ESD), to automatically detect anomalies
in Twitter’s production data. The algorithm uses a mod-
ified STL decomposition (discussed in subsubsection 3.4.1)
to extract the residual component of the input time series
and then applies ESD to detect anomalies.
This two step process allows S-ESD to detect both global
anomalies that extend beyond the expected seasonal mini-
mum and maximum and local anomalies that would other-
wise be masked by the seasonality.
A formal description of the algorithm is presented in Al-
gorithm 1.
In the rest of this subsection, we detail the modified STL
algorithm, elaborate S-ESD’s ability to detect global and
local anomalies, as well as the limitations of the algorithm.
Section 4 presents the efficacy of S-ESD using production
data – both core drivers (or business metrics) and system
metrics.
3.4.1 STL Variant
Applying STL decomposition to time series of system met-
rics yielded, in some cases, spurious anomalies (i.e., anoma-
lies not present in the original time series) in the residual
component. For example, let us consider the time series
shown in Figure 6a wherein we observe a region of continu-
ous anomalies in the raw data. On applying STL decomposi-
tion, we observed a breakout (ala a pulse) in the trend com-
ponent. On deriving the residual component using Equa-
tion 14, we observed an inverse breakout, highlighted with
a red rectangle in Figure 6a, which in turn yielded spurious
anomalies.
To address the above, we use the median of the time series
to represent the “stable” trend value which is in turn used
to compute the residual component as follows:
Algorithm 1 S-ESD Algorithm
Input:
X = A time series
n = number of observations in X
k = max anomalies (iterations in ESD)
Output:
XA = An anomaly vector wherein each element is a tuple
(timestamp, observed value)
Require:
k ≤ (n× .49)
1. Extract seasonal component SX using STL Variant
2. Compute median X˜
/* Compute residual */
3. RX = X − SX − X˜
/* Detect anomalies vector XA using ESD */
4. XA = ESD(R, k)
return XA
RX = X − SX − X˜ (15)
where X is the raw time series, SX is the seasonal compo-
nent as determined by STL, and X˜ is the median of the raw
time series. Replacing the trend with the median eliminates
the spurious anomalies in the residual component as exem-
plified by Figure 6b. From the figure we note that the region
highlighted with a green rectangle does not have any spuri-
ous anomalies, unlike the corresponding region in Figure 6a.
3.4.2 Global and Local Anomalies
Unlike the techniques overviewed in Section 2, S-ESD can
detect local anomalies that would otherwise be masked by
seasonal data. These local anomalies are bound between
the seasonal minimum and maximum and may not not ap-
pear to be anomalous from a global perspective. However,
they are indeed anomalous and it is important to detect
these as they represent a deviation from the historical pat-
tern. For instance, local anomalies found in Twitter data
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Figure 7: Global and Local Anomalies Exposed using S-ESD
(a) Anomalies detected via S-ESD: 1.11% Anomalies (α =0.05)
(b) Anomalies detected via S-H-ESD: 29.68% Anomalies (α =0.05)
Figure 8: S-ESD (a) vs. S-H-ESD performance with highly anomalous data
and other social network data, may reflect changes in user
behavior, or the systems in the data center/cloud. Figure 7
illustrates the use of STL variant to expose both global and
local anomalies.
3.4.3 S-ESD Limitations
Although S-ESD can be used for detection of both global
and local anomalies, S-ESD does not fare well when applied
to data sets that have a high percentage of anomalies. This
is exemplified by Figure 8a wherein S-ESD does not capture
the anomalies corresponding to the region highlighted by the
red rectangle.
As discussed earlier in subsection 2.2, a single large value
can inflate both the mean and the standard deviation. This
makes ESD conservative in tagging anomalies and results in
a large number of false negatives. In the following section
we detail the application of robust statistics as a further
refinement of S-ESD.
3.5 Seasonal Hybrid ESD (S-H-ESD)
Seasonal Hybrid ESD (S-H-ESD) builds upon the S-ESD al-
gorithm described in the previous subsection. In particular,
S-H-ESD uses the robust statistical techniques and metrics
discussed in subsection 2.2 to enable a more consistent mea-
sure of central tendency of a time series with a high per-
centage of anomalies. For example, let us consider the time
series shown in Figure 8a. From the graph we observe that
the seasonal component is apparent in the middle region of
the time series; however, a significantly large portion of the
time series is anomalous. This can inflate the mean and
standard deviation, resulting in true anomalies being mis-
labeled as not anomalous and consequently yielding a high
number of false negatives.
Mean Median Std. Dev. MAD
6.59 5.45 3.08 1.52
Table 1: Comparison of Mean vs. Median and Standard
Deviation vs. Median Absolute Deviation
We addressed the above by replacing the mean and stan-
dard deviation used in ESD with more robust statistical
measures during the calculation of the test statistic (refer to
Equation 5); in particular, we use the median and MAD, as
these metrics exhibit a higher breakdown point (discussed
earlier in Section 2.2).
Table 1 lists the aforementioned metrics for the time series
in Figure 8. The anomalies induce a small difference between
the mean and median (≈ 1.2%), however the standard de-
viation is > 2× the median absolute deviation. This results
in S-ESD detecting only 1.11% of the data as “anomalous”,
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whereas S-H-ESD correctly detects 29.68% of the input time
series as anomalous – contrast the two graphs shown in Fig-
ure 8b.
Note that using the median and MAD requires sorting the
data and consequently the run time of S-H-ESD is higher
than that of S-ESD. Therefore, in cases where the time se-
ries under consideration is large but with a relatively low
anomaly count, it is advisable to use S-ESD. A detailed
performance comparison between the two approaches is pre-
sented in Section 4.3.
4. EVALUATION
In this section we outline our methodology for evaluating the
proposed techniques, discuss the deployment in production,
and last but not the least, present results to demonstrate
the efficacy of the proposed techniques.
4.1 Methodology
The efficacy of S-ESD and S-H-ESD was evaluated using a
wide corpus of time series data obtained from production.
The time series corresponded to both low-level system met-
rics and higher-level core drivers (business metrics). For ex-
ample, but not limited to, the following metrics were used:
r System Metrics
z CPU utilization
z Heap usage
z Time spent in GC (garbage collection)
z Disk writes
r Application Metrics
z Request rate
z Latency
r Core Drivers
z Tweets per minute (TPM)
z Retweets per minute (RTPM)
z Unique Photos Per Minute (UPPM)
More than 20 data sets were used for evaluation. The system
metrics ranged from two-week long periods to four-week long
periods, with hour granularity. The core drivers metrics
were all four-week periods, with minute granularity.
4.2 Production
Increasingly, machine-generated BigData is being used to
drive performance and efficiency of data centers/cloud com-
puting platforms. BigData is often characterized by volume
and velocity [43, 44]. Given the multitude of services in our
service-oriented-architecture (SOA), and the fact that each
service monitors a large set of metrics, it is imperative to
automatically detect anomalies2 in the time series of each
metric. We have deployed the proposed techniques for auto-
matic detection of anomalies in production data for a wide
set of services.
One can also set a threshold to refine the set of anomalies
detected (using the proposed techniques) based on the spe-
cific requirements of the service owner. For example, it is
2A manual approach would be prohibitive from a cost per-
spective and would also be error-prone.
possible for capacity engineers to set a threshold such that
only anomalies greater than the specified threshold are re-
ported.
Based on extensive experimentation and analysis, S-H-
ESD with α = 0.05 (95% confidence) was selected for de-
tecting anomalies in the metrics mentioned in the previous
subsection. For each metric, S-H-ESD is run over a time se-
ries containing the last 14 days worth of data and an e-mail
report is sent out if one or more anomalies were detected
the previous day. The anomalies and time series are plotted
using an in-house data visualization and analytics frame-
work called Chiffchaff. Chiffchaff uses the ggplot2 plotting
environment in R to produce graphs similar to the graphs
shown in this paper. Additionally, CSVs with the metric,
timestamps and magnitude of any anomalies detected is also
attached to the email report.
4.3 Efficacy
In this section we detail the efficacy of S-ESD and S-H-
ESD using the metrics mentioned earlier in this section. In
particular, the following – precision, recall, and F-measure
– described previously in subsection 2.3, are reported.
4.3.1 Perspectives
The performance of S-ESD and S-H-ESD was investigated
from three different perspectives –
(a) Capacity engineering (CapEng), (b) User behavior
(UB) and (c) Supervised learning (Inj), wherein anomalies
were injected in the input time series to obtain labeled data.
In the first two cases, service owners set a threshold that
was then used to categorize the detected anomalies into true
positives (TP) and false positives (FP).
Specifically,
r The CapEng perspective was motivated by the fact
that in capacity planning, a primary goal is to effec-
tively scale the system resources to handle the normal
operating levels of the traffic, e.g., the expected daily
maximum, while maintaining enough headroom to ab-
sorb anomalies in input traffic.
Thus, the objective in the current context is to detect
anomalies that have a magnitude greater than a pre-
specified threshold (which is in turn determined via
load testing).
r From a user behavior (UB) perspective, the local intra-
day anomalies serve as potential signals of change in
user behavior. To this end, the service owners set the
threshold on the residual component of the time series
of interest.
Note that setting a threshold as mentioned above is
intrinsically directed toward detection of only positive
anomalies. In other words, anomalies in the right tail
of the underlying data distribution are detected.
r Lastly, the Inj perspective is aimed to assess the ef-
ficacy of the proposed techniques in the presence of
ground-truth (or labeled data). Given the volume, ve-
locity, and real-time nature of production data, it is
not practically feasible to obtain labeled anomalies.
To alleviate this limitation, we first fit a smooth spline
(B-spline) curve to a time series (obtained from pro-
duction) to derive a time series which had the same
characteristics – trend and seasonality – as of the orig-
inal time series. Subsequently, positive anomalies were
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One-Tail (Capacity) Alpha = 0.05 Alpha = 0.001 # of Observations
S-ESD S-H-ESD S-ESD S-H-ESD
Dataset # Precision Recall Fmeasure Precision Recall Fmeasure Precision Recall Fmeasure Precision Recall Fmeasure
System 1 1.00 0.05 0.09 0.26 1.00 0.41 1.00 0.02 0.05 0.28 1.00 0.44 337
System 2 1.00 0.04 0.07 0.95 0.87 0.91 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.95 0.81 0.88 721
System 3 1.00 0.14 0.25 0.98 0.93 0.95 1.00 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.77 0.87 601
System 4 1.00 0.57 0.73 0.71 0.99 0.82 1.00 0.43 0.60 0.84 0.95 0.89 913
System 5 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.99 337
System 6 0.75 0.28 0.41 0.65 0.34 0.45 0.80 0.13 0.22 0.75 0.28 0.41 721
Average 0.96 0.35 0.42 0.75 0.85 0.76 0.96 0.26 0.31 0.80 0.80 0.75
Core Driver 1 0.99 0.48 0.65 0.83 0.78 0.80 1.00 0.40 0.57 0.95 0.61 0.74 43195
Core Driver 2 1.00 0.03 0.06 0.96 0.25 0.39 1.00 0.01 0.02 1.00 0.05 0.10 43200
Core Driver 3 0.08 1.00 0.14 0.05 1.00 0.10 0.12 1.00 0.22 0.08 1.00 0.14 43200
Core Driver 4 0.34 0.20 0.25 0.20 0.30 0.24 0.54 0.18 0.27 0.29 0.22 0.25 43200
Core Driver 5 0.36 0.98 0.52 0.19 0.98 0.32 0.53 0.98 0.69 0.33 0.98 0.49 43200
Core Driver 6 0.08 0.69 0.14 0.06 0.69 0.11 0.12 0.69 0.20 0.08 0.69 0.14 43200
Core Driver 7 0.27 0.97 0.42 0.20 0.97 0.33 0.33 0.97 0.49 0.25 0.97 0.40 43200
Core Driver 8 0.66 0.95 0.78 0.58 0.99 0.73 0.80 0.63 0.71 0.67 0.95 0.78 43200
Core Driver 9 0.80 0.54 0.65 0.58 0.63 0.60 0.91 0.53 0.67 0.72 0.56 0.63 43178
Core Driver 10 0.82 0.20 0.32 0.67 0.30 0.42 1.00 0.08 0.14 0.81 0.20 0.32 43200
Average 0.54 0.60 0.39 0.43 0.69 0.40 0.63 0.55 0.40 0.52 0.62 0.40
Table 2: CapEng Perspective: Precision, Recall, and F-measure
One-Tail (User Behavior) Alpha = 0.05 Alpha = 0.001 # of Observations
S-ESD S-H-ESD S-ESD S-H-ESD
Dataset # Precision Recall Fmeasure Precision Recall Fmeasure Precision Recall Fmeasure Precision Recall Fmeasure
System 1 1.00 0.02 0.04 0.60 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.01 0.02 0.65 1.00 0.79 337
System 2 1.00 0.03 0.06 1.00 0.68 0.81 1.00 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.63 0.77 721
System 3 1.00 0.12 0.22 1.00 0.82 0.90 1.00 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.67 0.80 601
System 4 1.00 0.49 0.66 0.84 1.00 0.91 1.00 0.37 0.54 1.00 0.96 0.98 913
System 5 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 337
System 6 1.00 0.38 0.55 1.00 0.53 0.69 1.00 0.16 0.27 1.00 0.38 0.55 721
Average 1.00 0.34 0.42 0.90 0.84 0.84 1.00 0.26 0.31 0.94 0.77 0.81
Core Driver 1 1.00 0.46 0.63 1.00 0.90 0.95 1.00 0.38 0.55 1.00 0.61 0.76 43195
Core Driver 2 1.00 0.03 0.05 1.00 0.21 0.35 1.00 0.01 0.02 1.00 0.04 0.08 43200
Core Driver 3 1.00 0.27 0.43 1.00 0.40 0.57 1.00 0.18 0.30 1.00 0.28 0.43 43200
Core Driver 4 1.00 0.03 0.05 1.00 0.07 0.13 1.00 0.02 0.03 1.00 0.03 0.07 43200
Core Driver 5 1.00 0.22 0.36 1.00 0.41 0.58 1.00 0.15 0.25 1.00 0.23 0.38 43200
Core Driver 6 1.00 0.39 0.56 1.00 0.52 0.68 1.00 0.27 0.42 1.00 0.39 0.56 43200
Core Driver 7 1.00 0.72 0.84 1.00 0.96 0.98 1.00 0.59 0.74 1.00 0.77 0.87 43200
Core Driver 8 1.00 0.24 0.39 1.00 0.29 0.45 1.00 0.13 0.24 1.00 0.24 0.39 43200
Core Driver 9 1.00 0.35 0.52 1.00 0.56 0.72 1.00 0.30 0.46 1.00 0.40 0.58 43178
Core Driver 10 1.00 0.14 0.25 1.00 0.28 0.43 1.00 0.05 0.09 1.00 0.15 0.26 43200
Average 1.00 0.29 0.41 1.00 0.46 0.58 1.00 0.21 0.31 1.00 0.32 0.44
Table 3: User Behavior Perspective: Precision, Recall, and F-measure
injected in the derived time series, with varying magni-
tudes, widths, and frequency. The positions and mag-
nitudes of the injected anomalies were recorded and
used to compare against the anomalies detected by
both S-ESD and S-H-ESD.
4.3.2 Results
We computed Precision, Recall, and F-measure (refer to Sec-
tion 2.3) to assess the efficacy of S-ESD and S-H-ESD from
the three perspectives.
Right-tailed (/positive) anomalies were detected at both
95% and 99.9% confidence levels. The metrics are reported
in Tables 2 (CapEng), 3 (UB), and 4 (Inj).
From the tables we note the following: across both sys-
tem metrics and core drivers, precision increases from about
75% in the CapEng perspective to 100% in the UB per-
spective for S-ESD, and about 59% to 95% for S-H-ESD.
The threshold set in the CapEng perspective results in la-
beling of the intra-day or off-peak anomalies as false pos-
itives, thereby lowering the precision. In contrast, in the
UB perspective, the threshold is set for the residual com-
ponent which removes the seasonality effect. This results
in S-H-ESD’s higher recall rates, which improve from 47.5%
(S-ESD) to 77% (S-H-ESD) for CapEng and from 31.5%
(S-ESD) to 65% (S-H-ESD) for UB.
Comparative analysis of the F-measure reported in Tables
2 and 3 highlights that the F-measure is better in the latter
case. This can be attributed, in part, to the fact that in
case of the latter the service-owners set the thresholds over
the residual component (recall that the time series decom-
position removes the trend and seasonal component). This
makes anomaly detection independent of the time at which
they occurred, e.g., on-peak on a daily max, or off-peak on
a daily trough. The low values of F-measure in the CapEng
perspective are reasoned at the end of this section.
Table 4 reports the efficacy of S-ESD and S-H-ESD from
the Inj (Ground-Truth) perspective. From the table we
note that the precision achieved was 100%, meaning that
all anomalies detected were true anomalies (there were no
false positives). Also, the recall was very high, achieving
about 96% and 97% (for S-ESD and S-H-ESD respectively)
at the 95% confidence level and about 94% and 95% recall
at the 99.9% confidence level.
On further analysis we noted that false negatives (anoma-
lies that were not detected) were within the boundaries of
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One-Tail (Injection) Alpha = 0.05 Alpha = 0.001 # of Observations
S-ESD S-H-ESD S-ESD S-H-ESD
Dataset Precision Recall Fmeasure Precision Recall Fmeasure Precision Recall Fmeasure Precision Recall Fmeasure
mag.75 width5 pct100 1 0.72 0.84 1 0.79 0.88 1 0.61 0.76 1 0.70 0.82 43200
mag1.5 width5 pct100 1 0.96 0.98 1 0.99 0.99 1 0.89 0.94 1 0.94 0.97 43200
mag3 width5 pct100 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 43200
mag3 width10 pct100 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 43200
mag3 width25 pct100 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 43200
mag3 width50 pct100 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 43200
mag3 width100 pct100 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 43200
mag6 width5 pct100 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 43200
Average 1.00 0.96 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.94 0.96 1.00 0.95 0.97 345600
Table 4: Anomaly Injection Perspective: Precision, Recall, and F-measure
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Figure 9: F-measure: CapEng vs. UB vs. Inj (95% Confi-
dence)
the anomalies detected, normally at the tail ends (at the
beginning or end of the sustained anomalous behavior).
Lastly, the results reported Table 4 correspond to injection
sets containing anomalies with increasing magnitudes from
0.75σ to 6σ. At 0.75σ, the F-measure of S-ESD and S-H-
ESD begins to degrade (0.84 (S-ESD) and 0.88 (S-H-ESD)
at the 95% confidence level and 0.76 (S-ESD) 0.82 (S-H-
ESD) at the 99.9% confidence level). At 1.5σ, the F-measure
was about 0.97 on an average. Injected anomalies with a
magnitude of 3σ or greater achieved an F-measure of 1.00.
Figure 9 summarizes the overall F-measure average for
the three perspectives at the 95% confidence level. From
the figure we note that in each case S-H-ESD outperformed
S-ESD; in particular, the F-measure increased by 17.5%,
29.5% and 0.62% for CapEng, UB, and Inj respectively. This
stems from the fact that median and MAD, unlike mean
and standard deviation, are robust against a large number
of outliers.
The F-measure for the CapEng and UB perspectives is
Raw Data Anomalies >  Capacity Threshold Anomalies <  Capacity Threshold
Figure 10: Illustration of false positives in CapEng perspec-
tive
significantly lower than the Inj perspective. This can be
ascribed to the following: Capacity planning engineers typi-
cally determine the capacity needed to withstand the typical
daily peaks (with additional headroom), thus the service-
owners tend to set the threshold around the maximum daily
peaks. Consequently, anomalies which occur during the
off-peak hours of the day, such as in the daily troughs or
other intra-day locations, would be marked as false positives
(even though they might still be anomalous from S-ESD/S-
H-ESD’s point of view). This is illustrated in Figure 10
wherein the anomalies (detected using S-H-ESD) above the
pre-specified threshold are annotated by # and the rest are
annotated by 4. The latter, albeit “true” anomalies from
a statistical standpoint, are tagged as false positives which
adversely impact precision (refer to Equation 9).
5. PREVIOUS WORK
In this section, we overview prior work in the context of
anomaly detection. A lot of anomaly detection research has
been done in various domains such as, but not limited to,
statistics, signal processing, finance, econometrics, manufac-
turing, and networking. For a detailed coverage of the same,
the reader is referred to books and survey papers [16, 17, 18,
19].
For better readability, we have partitioned this section
into subsections on a per domain basis. As mentioned in a
recent survey on anomaly detection [20], anomaly detection
is highly contextual in nature. Based on our in-depth lit-
erature survey we find that the techniques discussed in the
rest of this section cater to different type of data sets (than
cloud infrastructure data) and hence are complementary to
the techniques proposed in this paper.
Manufacturing
Anomaly detection manifests itself in manufacturing in the
form of determining if a particular process is in a state of
normal and stable behavior. To this end, Statistical Process
Control (SPC) was proposed in the early 1920s to monitor
and control the reliability of a manufacturing process [45,
46]. Control charts are one of the key tools used in SPC.
In essence, the premise of SPC is that a certain amount
of variation can occur at any one point of a production
chain. The variation is “common” if it is controlled and
within normal or expected limits. However, the variation
is “assignable” if it is not present in the causal system of
the process at all times (i.e., falls outside of the normal lim-
its). Identifying and removing the assignable sources which
have impact on the manufacturing process is thus crucial to
ensure the expected operation and quality of the manufac-
turing process.
A traditional control chart includes points representing
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a statistical measurement (such as the mean) of a quality
characteristic in samples taken over a period of time. The
mean of this characteristic is calculated over all samples, and
plotted as the center line. The standard deviation is calcu-
lated over all samples, and the upper control limit (UCL)
and lower control limit (LCL) defined as the threshold at
which the process is considered statistically unlikely to oc-
cur (typically set at 3 standard deviations, denoted by 3σ,
about the mean/center line). When the process is “in con-
trol”, 99.73% of all points are within the upper and lower
control limits. A signal may be generated when observations
fall outside of these control limits, signifying the introduc-
tion of some other source of variation outside of the normal
expected behavior.
Methodologies for improving the performance of control
charts have been investigated since Shewhart’s early work.
Roberts proposed the geometrical moving average control
chart – also known as the EWMA (exponentially weighted
moving average) control chart – which weights the most
recent samples more highly than older samples [47]. The
EWMA chart tends to detect small shifts (1-2 σ) in the
sample mean more efficiently; however, the Shewhart chart
tends to detect larger shift (3 σ) more efficiently. In case the
quality characteristic follows a Poisson distribution, alterna-
tives to the EWMA chart have been proposed [48]. Other
types of control charts, such as the CUSUM (cumulative
sum) chart [49], have been proposed. In [50], Lowry and
Montgomery present a review on control charts for multi-
variate quality control. For further details on SPC and con-
trol charts, the reader is referred to the surveys by Woodall
and Montgomery [51] and by Stoumbos et al. [52]. Lastly,
a recent survey by Tsung et al. presents a comprehensive
survey of statistical control methods for multistage manu-
facturing and service operations [53].
Finance
Behavioral economics and finance study the causal relation-
ships between social, cognitive, and emotional factors on the
economic decisions of individuals and institutions, and their
effect on the economic decisions such as market prices and
returns.
The interplay of the aforementioned factors often result in,
but not limited to, seasonal stock market anomalies. These
seasonal anomalies, also referred to as “calendar effects”,
take many forms. Haugen and Jorion describe the January
Effect – stocks, especially small stocks, historically gener-
ate abnormally high returns during the month of January
– as “... perhaps the best-known example of anomalous be-
havior in security markets throughout the world” [54]. This
effect is normally attributed to a theory which states that
the investors who hold a disproportionate amount of small
stocks sell their stocks for tax reasons at the end of the year
(to claim capital loss), and then reinvest at the start of the
new year. On the other hand, the January effect is also
attributed to the end of year bonuses which are paid in Jan-
uary and used to purchase stocks (thus driving up prices).
In [55], Angelovska reports that early studies on stock
market anomalies began in the late 1920’s, where Kelly’s
reports [56] showed the existence of a so-called “Monday ef-
fect” – US markets have low and negative Monday returns.
The Monday effect in the US sock market was actively re-
searched in the 1980s [57] [58] [59]. In [60], Coutts and Hayes
showed that the Monday effect exists albeit not as strongly
as previous work demonstrated. Wang et al. show that be-
tween 1962 and 1993, the Monday effect is strongly evident
in the last two weeks of the month, for a wide array of stock
indices. For a full literature review on the Monday effect,
refer to [61].
Numerous studies support the existence of calendar ef-
fects in stock markets, as well as others such as “turn of
the month” effects. For instance, Hensel and Ziemba exam-
ined S&P 500 returns over a 65 year period from 1928 to
1993, and reported that U.S. large-cap stocks consistently
show higher returns at the turn of the month [62]. In con-
trast, Sullivan et al. argue against the case, stating that
there is no statistically significant evidence supporting the
claim, and that such periodicities in stock market behavior
are the result of data dredging [63]. Subsequently, Hansen
et al. attempted to use sound statistical approaches to eval-
uate the significance of calendar effects, by tightly control-
ling the testing to avoid data mining biases [64]. In their
study of 27 stock indices from 10 countries, calendar effects
were found to be significant in most returns series, with the
end-of-the-year effect producing the largest anomalies and
the most convincing evidence supporting calendar effects in
small-cap indices.
Signal Processing
Techniques from signal processing such as, but not limited
to, spectral analysis, have been adopted for anomaly detec-
tion. For instance, in [65], Cheng et al. employed spectral
analysis to complement existing DoS defense mechanisms
that focus on identifying attack traffic, by ruling out normal
TCP traffic, thereby reducing false positives.
Similarly, wavelet packets and wavelet decomposition have
been used for detecting anomalies in network traffic [66, 67,
68, 69, 70]. Benefits of wavelet-based techniques include the
ability to accurately detect anomalies at various frequencies
(due to the inherent time-frequency property of decompos-
ing signals into different components at several frequencies),
with relatively fast computation.
In [71], Gao et al. proposed a speed optimization for real-
time use using sliding windows. Recently, Lu et al. proposed
an approach consisting of three components: (1) feature
analysis, (2) normal daily traffic modeling based on wavelet
approximation and ARX (AutoRegressive with eXogenous),
and intrusion decision [72]. An overview of signal processing
techniques for network anomaly detection, including PSD
(Power Spectral Density) and wavelet-based approaches, is
presented in [73].
Additionally, Kalman filtering and Principle Component
Analysis (PCA) based approaches have been proposed in
the signal processing domain for anomaly detection. In
[74], Ndong and Salamatian reported that PCA-based ap-
proaches exhibit improved performance when coupled with
Karuhen-Loeve expansion (KL); on the other hand, Kalman
filtering approaches, when combined with statistical meth-
ods such as Gaussian mixture and Hidden Markov models,
outperformed the PCA-KL method.
Network Traffic
With the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm [75, 76] increas-
ingly becoming ubiquitous3, there is an increasing concern
about security. In a post the FTC said on its website [78]:
“At the same time, the data collection and sharing that
smart devices and greater connectivity enable pose privacy
3According to a study by ABI Research [77], it is estimated
that 10 billion devices are currently connected to one an-
other by wired or wireless Internet. By the year 2020, that
number is expected to exceed 30 billion.
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and security risks. Over the years, various anomaly detec-
tion techniques have been proposed for detection network
intrusion.
For example, in [79], Denning proposed a rule-based tech-
nique wherein both network (system) and user data was used
to detect different types of abnormal behavior, by comparing
audit-trails to different anomalous profiles or models.
In [80], Lazarevic et al. presented a comparative study
of several anomaly detection schemes for network intrusion
detection.
In [81], Garcia-Teodoro et al. presented an overview of
the pros and cons of various approaches for anomaly detec-
tion in network intrusion systems such as statistical tech-
niques, knowledge-based techniques (finite state machines,
Bayesian networks, expert systems, etc.), and learning based
classification of patterns (Markov models, neural networks,
fuzzy logic, clustering, et cetera). Recently, Gogoi et al. pre-
sented a comprehensive survey on outlier detection for net-
work anomaly detection in [82]; in particular, the authors
classified the approaches into three categories: (1) distance-
based, (2) density-based, and (3) machine learning or soft-
computing based.
The reader is referred to the survey of intrusion detection
techniques by Yu for further reading [83].
Statistics
Anomaly detection has been actively researched for over five
decades in the domain of statistics [84, 85, 86, 16, 87]. Re-
cent surveys include the ones from Hodge and Jim [18] and
Chandola et al. [88].
The key focus of prior work has been to determine whether
a single value is statistically anomalous with respect to an
underlying distribution. Work by Markov and Chebyshev
provided bounds on the probability of a random value with
respect to the expected value of the distribution. The Markov
inequality states that for any non-negative random vari-
able X, the following holds true P (X > α) ≤ E[X]/α,
while the more general Chebyshev inequality states that
P (|X − E[X]| > α) ≤ V ar[X]/α2, and shows that values
equal to or greater then K standard deviations from the
expected value constitute no more then 1/k2 of the total
distribution.
These bounds can be used as a threshold for determin-
ing the “outlierness” of a random value, indicating that a
value does not fit the underlying distribution [17]; however,
the Markov and Chebyshev inequalities are non-parametric,
and create relatively weak bounds that may miss potential
outliers in the data [19]. The Chernoff bound and the Ho-
effding inequality attempt to create tighter bounds by mak-
ing assumptions about the underlying distribution. While
these tail inequalities provided a closer bounds for testing
the outlierness of a data point, their assumptions regarding
the distribution make them unsuitable for use when the dis-
tribution doesn’t follow their underlying assumptions (as in
the current context).
Further, the Box plot may be applied as a robust means of
determining if a data point is anomalous with respect to the
underlying distribution [89]. A Box plot divides the data
into five groups: the minimum non-anomalous value (min),
the lower quartile (Q1), the median, the upper quartile (Q3)
and the maximum non-anomalous value (max). Data that is
1.5× lower then (Q1) or 1.5× greater then (Q3) are typically
considered anomalous.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented two novel statistical techniques
for automatically detecting anomalies in cloud infrastruc-
ture data. Although there exists a large body of research
in anomaly detection, the seasonal (and trending) nature
of cloud infrastructure data limits the application of tech-
niques. To this end, we proposed a method called Seasonal-
ESD (S-ESD), which combines seasonal decomposition and
the Generalized ESD test, for anomaly detection. The sec-
ond method, Seasonal-Hybrid-ESD (S-H-ESD), builds on S-
ESD to enable robust anomaly detection when a significant
portion (up to 50%) of the underlying data is anomalous.
This is achieved by extending the original ESD algorithm
with robust statistical measures, median and median abso-
lute deviation (MAD).
The efficacy of both S-ESD and S-H-ESD was evaluated
using both core metrics such as Tweets Per Sec (TPS), sys-
tem metrics such as CPU and heap usage and application
metrics. The evaluation was carried out from three differ-
ent perspectives, viz., capacity engineering (CapEng), user
behavior (UB), and supervised learning (Inj). Precision, Re-
call, and F-measure in each case. Overall, S-H-ESD outper-
formed S-ESD, with F-Measure increasing by 17.5%, 29.5%
and 0.62% for CapEng, UB, and Inj respectively.
In light of the fact that S-H-ESD more computationally
expensive than S-ESD (recall that the former requires sort-
ing of the data), it is recommended to use S-ESD in cases
where the time series under consideration is large but with
a relatively low anomaly count.
As future work, we plan to extend the proposed techniques
for detecting anomalies in long time series. The challenge in
this regard is that capturing the underlying trend,4 which
in our observation is predominant in the case of long time
series, is non-trivial in the presenece of anomalies. To this
end, we plan to explore the use of qunatile regression [90]
and/or robust regression [91, 92].
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